by Ira Straus
Thanks in part to the declassification of Defense Intelligence documents, connecting those missing dots seems to have finally reveled what most Middle East observers have known all along, that the rise of the terrorist group ISIS and the likelihood of establishing a terror state (a caliphate), had been predicated by both Obama’s the CIA and DIA, as far back as 2011.
And purposely created by the Obama Administration in part to isolate the Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad. The documents also predicted that the support given by the West, Turkey and the Persian Gulf Arab states to the Takfiri militants would eventually lead to the establishment of a Salafist Principality in Eastern Syria.
According to investigative reporter Nafeez Ahmed, the “leaked document reveals that in coordination with the Gulf states and Turkey, the West intentionally sponsored violent Islamist groups to destabilize Assad, despite anticipating that doing so could lead to the emergence of an ‘Islamic State’ in Iraq and Syria.”
Obviously Obama’s dismissal of ISIS being nothing more than a “JV” team and his apparent miscalculations in not keeping a residual force in place in Iraq, seems to be (as the documents indicate), considerably more sinister than first assumed, in that not leaving a contingency force behind was viewed by most Middle Eastern experts to have been a simple yet costly a tactical error.
However the documents are also shedding light on details referencing weapons operations inside Libya before the 2012 terror attack in Benghazi. And the report leaves no doubt that U.S. intelligence agencies were fully aware that weapons were being shipped from Benghazi to Syrian ports.
However what isn’t in dispute is that American servicemen and woman and those in Benghazi have been willfully sacrificed by a clandestine Middle Eastern policy that has seen the rise of the most brutal terrorist group within our lifetime, by an administration that seems to be more concerned in concealing the facts rather than protecting our National Security.
Here is a link to the Judicial Watch press release detailing the released documents. Here are the released documents themselves.
This is also why the Obama administration has tried its best to change the name of ISIS to ISIL. ISIS = the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The name gives a direct clue of its origins. Obama’s withdrawal of troops in Iraq and Obama’s arming these rebels in Syria created ISIS. But changing the name to ISIL, or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, diverts some attention to the Levant.
The current conflict in Syria began in 2011, when the US-backed opposition began an armed rebellion against President Bashar Assad’s stable government during the Arab Spring. By 2013, large portions of eastern Syria and western Iraq had fallen under control of militants known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (IS, or ISIS/ISIL). Watch what I do, not what I say: While declaring the need to fight ISIS, Washington has continued to demand the overthrow of Assad in favor of “moderate opposition” (ISIS).
Virginia Republican Senator Richard Black, who served in the US Marine Corps and retired as a Colonel in the Judge Advocate General (JAG) corps before getting elected to the Virginia legislature, favors the Assad government over the Muslim rebels. He maintains that the Assad government is effectively fighting against the Islamic State and protecting the remaining Christians of Syria, something he has done during his entire history. No matter what you think of Assad, Syria was a safe, stable country before Obama. Its fall, he says, would let ISIS quickly seize Jordan and Lebanon, and continue its drive westward.
From the National Review:
The Obama administration has caused or exacerbated most of the current problems in the Mideast. The Syria policy of the Obama administration is the main reason for the growth of the Islamic State (or ISIS) – and with it, for the current crisis in Iraq, and for a greatly increased danger of terrorism in Europe and America.
Administration policy has fanned the rebellion in Syria and kept it going for three full years, while doing nothing to bring it to a successful close. Sometimes the administration has explicitly tried to keep the rebels in a stalemate with Assad; Secretary of State Kerry said that it was his policy to do just that, in order to promote negotiations and “peace.” The result, so obvious as to make that statement a shameless Orwellianism, has been to keep the war dragging on.
This has provided the hothouse for the growth of the extremist Islamic State. In due course, it spilled over from Syria into Iraq, and it has issued threats against the American homeland. The Obama-Kerry policy has also made for the more than 190,000 deaths in Syria, 500,000 wounded, and 8 million refugees (more than 2 million abroad, 6 million inside Syria) — this, out of a population of about 22 million.
It is hard to imagine a policy more irresponsible, or worse from a moral standpoint. Yet it has been the long-standing policy of Obama and Kerry — and it was Secretary of State Clinton’s, too, until her last weeks in office, when she finally seemed to be getting serious, only to have her new plans thrown out by Kerry. Fanning a rebellion just up to the point where the country is bleeding continuously — what could be more horrible? As the saying goes, “It is worse than a crime, it is a mistake.” Worse, because it keeps compounding the crime, as a matter of principle. But absurd behaviors often have their causes in beliefs. This policy has been a logical product of the attitudes and ideologies of the Obama administration: anti-anti-Islamism, moral posturing, moral inversion — enthusiasm about toppling allies like Mubarak, nervousness about toppling adversaries like Assad — and, under the guise of peace, an ideological neutralism directed against one’s own side, something very different from an honestly neutral objectivity.
There are several other self-defeating U.S. policies that have nurtured the rise of the Islamic State, directly, indirectly and secretly. They go beyond Syria; indeed, they span the entire Mideast:
1. The “little and late” character of the current air strikes in Iraq. The U.S. for months ignored Iraq’s requests for help. It just let the Islamic State keep growing. The belated help has been minimalist, and it is given a false, self-limiting rationale. Militarily, the refusal to put boots on the ground means that we lack the guidance needed for fully effective air strikes. Politically, Obama has relied on Iraq’s democratic parliamentary process to make essential changes, and the most it has been capable of delivering is another leader from within Maliki’s Shi’a party, hardly a good beginning for winning back Sunni trust. What was plainly needed was a figure from Ayad Allawi’s mixed Shia-Sunni party instead.
2. The prior complete withdrawal from Iraq.
This compounded the mistake of the Bush administration in destabilizing Iraq, while undoing Bush’s very successful, self-corrective measure, the surge. Obama argues that he had to withdraw, after failing to get a new status-of-forces agreement, but that failure was far from a mere objective fact. Obama did not keep pushing by the usual methods that have gotten America status-of-forces agreements and allowed us to keep adequate long-term residual forces on the ground elsewhere. He was too interested in satisfying his domestic base with a total withdrawal.
3. Promoting “democracy” through demanding free participation of religious and sectarian parties in elections.
As I wrote earlier this week about our actions in Gaza, America regularly calls for “democratic” elections, open to all parties, including religious ones. This policy began under Bush, but he retreated when he saw that it worked badly; under Obama it became America’s fixed ideology, applied without regard for consequences throughout the Mideast. Uncritical democracy promotion is a very dangerous ideology. The elections we demanded brought Iraq to the edge of civil war. Elections have kept it there pretty much ever since.
The one relatively happy political period in the entire post-Saddam history of Iraq was prior to elections, under Allawi, whose party was genuinely inclusive religiously. Then the elections brought Maliki’s Shia confessional party to power, and it all went for naught.
What was needed — what is still needed — is not robust-sounding electoral democracy but civilized power-sharing among the different religious communities. This is called “consociationalism,” and it entails cooperation among the elites of different communities, with decisions made by consensus among their leaders. The aim is to distribute the benefits of decisions among the communities and avoid winner-take-all outcomes. That way, the common power structure is not perceived as a threat to any of the communities or as something they need to get control of in order to keep it out of the hands of an opposed community. Such a system is not easy to create or sustain.